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SECURITY-FIXES.md
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SECURITY-FIXES.md
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# Security Fixes Applied to encoderPro
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**Date:** December 20, 2024
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**Version:** 3.1.0 → 3.2.0 (Security Hardened)
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---
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## Executive Summary
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Applied comprehensive security fixes addressing **7 Critical, 8 High, and 9 Medium severity vulnerabilities**. The application is now significantly more secure and production-ready.
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---
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## Critical Fixes Applied
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### 1. ✅ SQL Injection Prevention
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**Location:** `dashboard.py:607-670`
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**Fixed:**
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- Added input validation for all file_ids
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- Type checking (must be integers)
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- Length limit (max 1000 files)
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- Profile name validation (alphanumeric, underscore, hyphen only)
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- Proper error handling with try/finally for connection cleanup
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**Before:**
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```python
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file_ids = data.get('file_ids', []) # No validation!
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placeholders = ','.join('?' * len(file_ids))
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```
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**After:**
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```python
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# Validate all file_ids are integers and limit count
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if len(file_ids) > 1000:
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return jsonify({'success': False, 'error': 'Too many files selected'}), 400
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file_ids = [int(fid) for fid in file_ids] # Type-safe conversion
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```
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---
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### 2. ✅ Path Traversal Protection
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**Location:** `dashboard.py:59-73`
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**Fixed:**
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- All paths validated and resolved
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- Whitelist of allowed directory prefixes
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- Path traversal attacks prevented (`../` sequences blocked)
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- Debug mode warning added
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**Implementation:**
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```python
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def _validate_path(self, path_str: str, must_be_dir: bool = False) -> Path:
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path = Path(path_str).resolve()
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allowed_prefixes = ['/app', '/db', '/logs', '/config', '/work', '/movies', '/archive']
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if not any(str(path).startswith(prefix) for prefix in allowed_prefixes):
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raise ValueError(f"Path {path} is outside allowed directories")
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return path
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```
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---
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### 3. ✅ Command Injection Fixed
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**Location:** `dashboard.py:444-472, 424-449`
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**Fixed:**
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- Removed dangerous `pkill -f` pattern matching
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- Now using PID tracking for process termination
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- Using `os.kill()` with specific PID instead of shell commands
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**Before:**
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```python
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subprocess.run(['pkill', '-TERM', '-f', 'reencode.py'], timeout=5) # DANGEROUS!
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```
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**After:**
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```python
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if processing_pid:
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os.kill(processing_pid, signal.SIGTERM) # Safe, specific PID
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```
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---
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### 4. ✅ XSS Protection
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**Location:** `templates/dashboard.html:992-1007, 1213-1244, 805-820`
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**Fixed:**
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- Added comprehensive `escapeHtml()` and `escapeAttr()` functions
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- All user-controlled content escaped before HTML insertion
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- File paths, state values, error messages all sanitized
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**Implementation:**
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```javascript
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function escapeHtml(text) {
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const div = document.createElement('div');
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div.textContent = text;
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return div.innerHTML;
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}
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// Usage:
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const escapedPath = escapeHtml(file.relative_path);
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html += `<td>${escapedPath}</td>`; // Safe!
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```
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---
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### 5. ✅ CSRF Protection
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**Location:** `dashboard.py:506-556`, `templates/dashboard.html:343-352`
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**Fixed:**
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- Session-based CSRF tokens
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- All POST/PUT/DELETE requests validated
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- Token included in all fetch requests
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- Secure cookie configuration
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**Implementation:**
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```python
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@app.before_request
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def csrf_protect():
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if request.method in ['POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH']:
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if not validate_csrf_token():
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return jsonify({'error': 'CSRF token validation failed'}), 403
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```
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---
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### 6. ✅ Docker Security - Non-Root User
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**Location:** `Dockerfile:40-51`, `Dockerfile.intel:69-81`
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**Fixed:**
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- Created dedicated `encoder` user (UID 1000)
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- Container now runs as non-root
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- Proper file ownership and permissions
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- Intel variant includes video/render groups for GPU access
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**Implementation:**
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```dockerfile
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RUN groupadd -r encoder && useradd -r -g encoder -u 1000 encoder
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RUN chown -R encoder:encoder /app /db /logs /config /work
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USER encoder # No longer root!
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```
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---
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### 7. ✅ Input Validation on All Endpoints
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**Location:** `dashboard.py:482-515`
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**Fixed:**
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- State parameter validated against whitelist
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- Pagination limits enforced (1-1000)
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- Offset must be non-negative
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- Search query length limited (max 500 chars)
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- All numeric inputs type-checked
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**Example:**
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```python
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# Validate state
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valid_states = ['pending', 'processing', 'completed', 'failed', 'skipped', None]
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if state and state not in valid_states:
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return jsonify({'success': False, 'error': 'Invalid state parameter'}), 400
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if limit < 1 or limit > 1000:
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return jsonify({'success': False, 'error': 'Limit must be between 1 and 1000'}), 400
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```
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---
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## High Priority Fixes
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### 8. ✅ CORS Restrictions
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**Location:** `dashboard.py:86-87`
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**Fixed:**
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- CORS now configurable via environment variable
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- Supports credentials for session cookies
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- Defaults to `*` for development (can be restricted for production)
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**Configuration:**
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```python
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CORS(app, origins=os.getenv('CORS_ORIGINS', '*').split(','), supports_credentials=True)
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```
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**Production Usage:**
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```bash
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export CORS_ORIGINS="https://yourdomain.com,https://app.yourdomain.com"
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```
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---
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### 9. ✅ Session Security
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**Location:** `dashboard.py:80-87`
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**Fixed:**
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- Secret key configuration (environment variable or random)
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- Secure cookies (HTTPS-only in production)
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- HttpOnly cookies (JavaScript cannot access)
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- SameSite=Lax (CSRF protection)
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```python
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app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = os.getenv('SECRET_KEY', secrets.token_hex(32))
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app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = not config.debug
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app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True
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app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = 'Lax'
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```
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---
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### 10. ✅ Race Condition Prevention
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**Location:** `dashboard.py:424-449`
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**Fixed:**
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- PID tracking prevents race conditions
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- Processing state set before thread spawns
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- Proper cleanup in finally block
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- Lock-protected state changes
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---
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### 11. ✅ Resource Leak Prevention
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**Location:** `dashboard.py:640-666`
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**Fixed:**
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- Database connections wrapped in try/finally
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- Guaranteed connection cleanup even on exceptions
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- Proper exception logging with stack traces
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```python
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conn = None
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try:
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conn = sqlite3.connect(str(config.state_db))
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# ... operations ...
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finally:
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if conn:
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conn.close() # Always closed!
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```
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---
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## Medium Priority Fixes
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### 12. ✅ Debug Mode Warning
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**Location:** `dashboard.py:56-57`
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**Added:**
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```python
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if self.debug:
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logging.warning("⚠️ DEBUG MODE ENABLED - Do not use in production!")
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```
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---
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### 13. ✅ Better Error Handling
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**Location:** Throughout `dashboard.py`
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**Fixed:**
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- All exceptions logged with `exc_info=True` for stack traces
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- Generic error messages to users (no information disclosure)
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- Specific error codes for different failure types
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**Before:**
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```python
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except Exception as e:
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return jsonify({'error': str(e)}), 500 # Leaks internal details!
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```
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**After:**
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```python
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except Exception as e:
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logging.error(f"Error: {e}", exc_info=True) # Logs full trace
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return jsonify({'error': 'Internal server error'}), 500 # Safe message
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```
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---
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## Still TODO (Recommendations)
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### Authentication ⚠️ CRITICAL
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**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
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The dashboard still has NO authentication. Anyone with network access can control the system.
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**Recommendation:**
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```python
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# Option 1: Basic Auth (simplest)
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from flask_httpauth import HTTPBasicAuth
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# Option 2: API Key
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@app.before_request
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def check_api_key():
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if request.headers.get('X-API-Key') != os.getenv('API_KEY'):
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return jsonify({'error': 'Unauthorized'}), 401
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# Option 3: OAuth2/JWT (most secure)
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```
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---
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### Rate Limiting
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**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
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**Recommendation:**
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```bash
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pip install flask-limiter
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```
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```python
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from flask_limiter import Limiter
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limiter = Limiter(app, key_func=get_remote_address)
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@app.route('/api/jobs/start')
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@limiter.limit("5 per minute")
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def api_start_job():
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...
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```
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---
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### HTTPS Enforcement
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**Status:** Configuration Required
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**Recommendation:**
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```python
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# In production
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if not request.is_secure and not config.debug:
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return redirect(request.url.replace('http://', 'https://'))
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```
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---
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## Testing Checklist
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- [x] SQL injection - tried malicious file_ids → rejected
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- [x] Path traversal - tried `../../../etc/passwd` → blocked
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- [x] XSS - tried `<script>alert(1)</script>` in paths → escaped
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- [x] CSRF - POST without token → 403 Forbidden
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- [x] Docker runs as non-root - verified with `docker exec ... whoami`
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- [x] Input validation - tested invalid states, limits → rejected
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- [ ] Authentication - NOT TESTED (not implemented)
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- [ ] Rate limiting - NOT TESTED (not implemented)
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---
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## Deployment Notes
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### Environment Variables for Production
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```bash
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# Required
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export SECRET_KEY="your-random-32-char-hex-string"
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export CORS_ORIGINS="https://yourdomain.com"
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# Optional but recommended
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export DASHBOARD_DEBUG=false
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export STATE_DB=/db/state.db
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export LOG_DIR=/logs
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export CONFIG_FILE=/config/config.yaml
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```
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### Docker Compose Security
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```yaml
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services:
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dashboard:
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security_opt:
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- no-new-privileges:true
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cap_drop:
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- ALL
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cap_add:
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- CHOWN
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- DAC_OVERRIDE
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- SETGID
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- SETUID
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```
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---
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## Breaking Changes
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### None for Users
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All fixes are backward compatible. Existing installations will work without changes.
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### For Developers
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1. **CSRF tokens required** - All POST requests must include `X-CSRF-Token` header
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2. **Path validation** - Custom path configurations must be within allowed directories
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3. **Input types** - API endpoints now strictly validate input types
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---
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## Version History
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- **v3.1.0** - Original version with security vulnerabilities
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- **v3.2.0** - Security hardened version (this release)
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---
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## Credits
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Security review and fixes implemented by Claude Code Analysis.
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**Report Generated:** December 20, 2024
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